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I. INTRODUCTION

The subject of the classification of unsecured claims in Chapter 13 is a subject which has been written about before.' There
have also been several informative and well written articles dealing
with Chapter 13 in general, which also refer to the problem of classification of claims in Chapter 13.2 This article will not attempt to
reiterate the principles and concepts stated in those articles.
*

Associate Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law. B.S. Geor-

gia Southern College, 1968; J.D. Mercer University, 1973.
** Member, State Bar of Virginia. B.A. University of Virginia, 1980; J.D.
Pepperdine University School of Law, 1984.
1. Vihon, Classification of Unsecured Claims: Squaring A Circle, 55 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 143 (1981).
2. Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operations, Its Statutory Requirements as to
Payments to and Classification of Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20
WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1980); Lee, Chapter 13 Nee Chapter XIII, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J.
303 (1979); Drake and Morris, Eligibility for Relief Under Chapter 13, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 195 (1983); Merrick, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 56 DENVER L.J. 585 (1979).
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Life is not easy. No one ever promised that it would be. Anyone attempting to write an article dealing with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783 certainly knows the true meaning of the phrase
"life is not easy."'4 This article began as an article proposing reform
for § 1322(b)(1) of the Code.5 Before this article could be published, § 1322(b)(1) was amended. The section as amended reads as
follows:
(b) subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan
may (1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in
§ 1122 of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any
class so designated; however, such plan may treat claims for a
consumer debt of the debtor if an individual is liable on such consumer debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured
claims: 6
This is a significant change from old Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 7 In essence, a Chapter 13 debtor may now designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class.

II. GENERAL COMMENTS
A.

The Problem

With this ability to designate a class or classes of unsecured
claims under the present Chapter 13 provisions, the problem being
confronted by the courts, debtors, and creditors is in determining
how one discriminates against a class or classes of unsecured
claims without being unfair. This is especially true in light of the
fact that most people with a fundamental understanding of the
English language often equate discrimination with unfairness. The
cases have approached this problem in several different ways.
There are many reasons why a debtor might wish to classify un3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as "the Code"].
4. Which reminds one of the saying often attributed to "Momma" that "Life
ain't easy, but even worse, it ain't fair either." Or, "Momma said there would be
bad days, but she never said they would come in bunches."
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (Collier 1985).
6. Id. In 1984 Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). Unless otherwise
noted, all future references to the Code will be as amended by said amendments.
7. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss3/2
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secured claims so as to allow differing treatment among-the various
holders of such claims. Some of the more obvious reasons include:
the existence of a co-signer on a note; various business reasons;8
job security where an employer is a creditor of the debtor;9 the
necessity of continued medical treatment from a particular physician; 10 the desirability, perhaps necessity, of maintaining a good relationship with one's landlord;" and the difficulty of paying a nondischargeable debt in full. 12 Undoubtedly, other reasons also exist.
To date, it is not clear just what the Code allows in the way of
classification, although the 1984 amendment makes it clear that
the existence of a co-signer is one legitimate reason for classification of a claim. Nevertheless, the other legitimate reasons which a
debtor might have for classifying claims are not necessarily allowable reasons under the present case law.
B.

The Statutory Provisions

In addition to present § 1322(b)(1) which is set forth above, it
is obviously necessary to look at § 1122 which is cited in §
1322(b)(1). Section 1122 is entitled "classification of claims or interests" and reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if
such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims
or interests of such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting
only of every unsecured claim that is less than or reduced to an
amount that the court approves as reasonable and necessary for
8. See In re Wolfe, 22 Bankr. 510 (Bankr. App. Panel, 9th Cir. 1982) wherein
the debtor proposed to pay two of his unsecured creditors in full while paying all
others substantially less. Debtor's reason for the discriminatory treatment was
that he would be unable to do business in the future without the cooperation of
the two creditors. Although the court disallowed the proposed classifications because the debtor failed to produce evidence in support of the stated reason, it
indicated such a classification is allowed by § 1322 under certain circumstances.
See also, In re Perskin, 9 Bankr. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) wherein the debtor
was allowed to discriminate in favor of a creditor because of the debtor's need to
use credit cards in his work as a traveling salesman.
9. In re Dziedzic, 9 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981).
10. In re Hill, 4 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
11. In re Kovich, 4 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).
12. In re Haag, 3 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. 42
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979); and In re Adams, 12 Bankr. 540 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
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administrative convenience.1 3
While § 1122 is helpful in Chapter 11 proceedings, its usefulness in
Chapter 13 is questionable. Nevertheless, Congress has seen fit to
refer to § 1122 in trying to guide the courts and others in what sort
of classification is proper in a Chapter 13 proceeding. As a result,
some courts have found themselves compelled to base their interpretation of § 1322(b)(1) on the meaning of § 1122. Such an interpretation leads to strange results indeed.
C.

Purpose of this Article

This article will attempt to analyze some of the cases interpreting § 1322(b)(1). This analysis will also look at the legislative
history of § 1322(b)(1). The ultimate purpose is to attempt to inform the reader what Congress apparently intended in drafting
and passing into law § 1322(b)(1). The authors are cognizant of the
difficulty of attempting to say what Congress had in mind in passing any piece of legislation. The difficulty here is perhaps even
greater than usual when one considers the problems the courts
have had with this particular provision of the Code. Nevertheless,
the present confusion as evidenced by the cases seems to make the
difficulty of the task worthwhile.1" A proposed statutory provision
consistent with the apparent purposes of Chapter 13, which is
readable and understandable, is set forth.1
III.

CLASSIFICATION OF UNSECURED CLAIMS

A simple reading of § 1322(b)(1) makes it clear that classification of unsecured claims is optional. Substantial amounts of litigation have developed concerning exactly what constitutes unfair discrimination and what the Code drafters intended by the
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (Collier 1985).
14. Naturally, there are other reasons why such an article is being written,
such as the "necessity" of such an article in the world of the modern (?) law
school setting, in one's rise through such titles as Assistant Professor of Law, Associate Professor of Law and Professor of Law. Perhaps even more important
than the journey from Assistant to Full Professor is the ability to enter into the
mystical world of secret meetings open only to the "tenured faculty member."
15. Based upon prior struggles with such legislation as the Internal Revenue
Code and the Bankruptcy Code, such a task is not only obviously difficult, but
perhaps contrary to generally accepted legislation drafting procedures. Of course
this raises the question as to whether there is in fact any such thing as a "generally accepted legislation drafting procedure" or a GALDP.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss3/2
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ambiguous phrase "substantially similar" in § 1122 of the Code.
The legislative history surrounding both § 1322 and § 1122 and the
key elements contained in each is less than illuminating. In fact,
the legislative notes following § 1322(b) make no mention whatsoever of the intended construction of "unfair discrimination" and
contain only a recitation of the section's language providing no
helpful insight. 16 The Judiciary Committee Notes regarding § 1122
are similarly unenlightening. In an effort to give some explanation
to the phrase "substantially similar," the Notes state:
It requires classification based on the nature of the claims or
interests classified, and permits inclusion of claims or interests in
a particular class only if the claim or interest being included is
17
substantially similar to the other claims or interests of the class.
With the arguably confusing language of the Code
sections
themselves and their attendant Committee Notes providing little
guidance in this area, the courts, practitioners, and debtors have
had to look to the development of case law in an attempt to understand what is in fact allowed by way of classification of unsecured
claims in a Chapter 13 case. The result has been the rise of three
schools of thought or theories.
A.

The Liquidation Test

This test can be aptly named the "almost anything goes" test.
It finds its origin in the case of In Re Sutherland.18 This case represents a liberal construction of § 1322(b)(1). The debtor sought
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that classified unsecured creditors into four separate categories as follows:
Class Three - Medical debts - persons or firms debtors must
continue to receive services from;
Class Four - Unsecured bank notes from banks needed to
stay in business;
Class Five - Credit accounts desired to be kept for continuation of doing business; and
Class Six - All other creditors.
The debtor's plan provided for sums to be paid to classes
16.
Sess. 5,
S. Rep.
17.
18.

See Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5927, [herinafter cited as
No. 989].
Id. at 5904.
3 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980).

reprinted in 1978 U.S.
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three, four and five but nothing to class six. The issue before the
court was whether the classification of claims was unfairly discriminatory under § 1322. The court said no. It held that when a creditor or class of creditors is not legally entitled to receive anything
under a Chapter 7 type liquidation, it cannot be classified in an
unfairly discriminatory manner in a Chapter 13 plan. In other
words, any claim that would receive zero in a Chapter 7 proceeding
is subject to any manner of classification, no matter how
ridiculous.19

The Sutherland court read § 1322(b)(1), § 1122, and §
1325(a)(4) together. Section 1325(a)(4) states in part that an unsecured claim must be paid ".

.

. not less than the amount that

would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7."2o Therefore, according to Sutherland, as
long as an unsecured creditor is receiving at least as much as that
creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 case there can be no unfair
discrimination against that creditor. In essence, Sutherland
reduces § 1322(b)(1) to saying that as long as § 1325(a)(4) is satis-

fied so is § 1322(b)(1). Such a result does not appear to reflect the
intent of Congress. The court went on to say that the rationality of
the classification is not a proper consideration under the Code."
The court stated:
The question under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) is not "rationality" of
the classification. The question is whether there is "unfairness"
between the classes. When a creditor or a class of creditors are
[sic] not legally entitled to receive anything, they [sic] cannot be
classified in an unfairly discriminatory manner. If a plan proposes
to pay each unsecured claim at least as much as that claim would
receive in liquidation under Chapter 7, the plan can propose to
pay additional sums to a single unsecured creditor or classes of
other unsecured creditors without unfairly discriminating. The
debtors are paying more than is 22legally required and the courts
should not discourage such plans.
At first blush, one tends to laugh at the simplicity of the reasoning in Sutherland. However, upon further reflection, one may

ask, "isn't Sutherland actually correct?" In any event, the Sutherland approach stands alone and has not been adopted by any other
19. Id. at 422.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss3/2
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B.

Strict Construction Approach

Anyone familiar with the law of bankruptcy is very familiar
with the opinions of Judge Ralph R. Mabey, former Bankruptcy
Judge for the District of Utah. Most bankruptcy practitioners, as
well as law professors, would undoubtedly agree that Judge Mabey's leaving the bench to enter into the world of private practice
has been the practitioners' gain and the courts' loss. It is of little
surprise that Judge Mabey's decision in this area is one of the
more persuasive and widely adopted ones. Judge Mabey set forth
his analysis of § 1322(b)(1) in the case of In re Iacovoni. 3 Iacovoni
consisted of eight factually similar Chapter 13 cases which, if filed
under Chapter 7, would result in zero distribution to unsecured
creditors, i.e. all were "no asset" cases. The issue to be decided was
"whether an unsecured debt for which there was a co-debtor may,
by reason of the co-debtor, be classified separately and treated differently from other secured debtors."2 Even though the 1984
amendments make it clear that classification is presently allowed
in such situations, Judge Mabey's analysis of whether or not classification was allowed under old § 1322(b)(1) is still very pertinent to
the question of whether or not classification will be allowed for
other reasons under the present § 1322(b)(1).
Judge Mabey answered the issue with a definite no. He first
turned to an analysis of the operative Code sections. He correctly
concluded that § 1322 allows the debtor to designate "a class or
classes of unsecured claims, as provided in § 1122 of this title, but
such designations can not discriminate unfairly against any class so
designated. 2 5 He further pointed out that § 1122 provides that "a
plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only as
such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or
interest of the class."2 6 After examining the legislative history,
Judge Mabey correctly concluded that the substantially similar
language contained in § 1122 was simply a codification of case law
requiring "classification based on the nature of the claims or interests classified. '2 7 Judge Mabey also cited favorably to Collier on
23. 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).

24. Id. at 260.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (Collier 1985).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (Collier 1985).

27. 2 Bankr. at 260.
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Bankruptcy construing "substantially similar" to be similar in legal character or effect as a claim against the debtor's assets or as
an interest in the debtor. ' The position of Judge Mabey regarding
§ 1122(a) is that only debts which have identical legal rights in the
debtor's or estate's assets may be classified together.2 9 Judge Mabey's analysis in this regard seems to be, from a technical reading
of the statute, imminently correct.
The difficulty with following Judge Mabey's approach is that
it results in limiting the classifications possible under § 1322 to the
"administrative convenience" exception set forth in § 1122(b).3 1 In
other words, any other type of discrimination in the treatment of
unsecured claims in Chapter 13 is unfairly discriminatory unless
the creditors in question actually have different legal rights against
the debtor or the debtor's estate. Of course, Judge Mabey correctly
concluded that the presence of a co-debtor in no way affects the
legal relationship of the claim in question vis-a-vis the debtor's estate or the debtor. Therefore, to prefer this creditor over other unsecured creditors is unfairly discriminatory.
Obviously, Judge Mabey's analysis is a 180 degree change from
the opinion of In re Sutherland.3 1 Judge Mabey in essence held
that Chapter 13 requires the debtor to "propose a legitimate or
substantial repayment of unsecured claims. ' 32 The effect of this
determination is to absolutely foreclose the possibility of confirmation to a no asset debtor proposing a minimum or zero payment
plan in Chapter 13, if the debtor has the ability to pay some unsecured creditors all or a high percentage of their claim because of
compelling business reasons, etc. Judge Mabey holds that you
must pay all unsecured creditors the same amount unless they
have some different legal rights against the debtor or the debtor's
estate itself. Of course, most general unsecured creditors will not
have any special rights against the debtor or the debtor's estate
which other general unsecured creditors do not also possess.
Therefore, the conclusion is that if Judge Mabey's analysis is followed to the technical extreme there will be no classification in a
Chapter 13 case other than an administrative convenience type ex1122.03 (15th ed. 1979).
28. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
29. 2 Bankr. 256.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (Collier 1985). Of course, the administrative convenience exemption has historically been normally limited to use in Chapter 11 reorganization cases.
31. 3 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980).
32. 2 Bankr. at 267.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss3/2
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ception as set forth in § 1122(b). Administrative convenience is not
normally a consideration in a Chapter 13 case as it is in a Chapter
11 case. Therefore, Judge Mabey's reading of § 1322(b)(1) virtually
eliminates classification of unsecured claims in a Chapter 13 case.
Of course, this is the exact opposite of the In re Sutherland" approach which allows classification in every instance as long as the
discriminated-against creditors are at least receiving as much as
they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.34
In light of present § 1325(b)(1), s5 Judge Mabey's analysis is
perhaps even more palatable in that it is now clear that a debtor
should propose a plan commensurate with his ability to pay.
Clearly, a debtor's ability to pay one creditor, or certain creditors
in full, is evidence of his ability to make meaningful payments to
others. However, this does not answer the question of what type of
classification is actually permissible. In fact, this seems to only address the overall validity of the plan itself. Clearly, the debtor proposing a plan should be required to make meaningful payments to
all creditors if he has the ability to do so.6 That same debtor
should also be allowed to treat certain unsecured claims differently
if he has legitimate reasons for doing so. The present provision
may not allow such different treatment, as Judge Mabey has so
eloquently shown. The point being that the classification question
should be a distinct and separate issue from the overall validity of
the plan itself.
C.

The PracticalityApproach

In re Dziedzic37 represents a synthesis of two complementary
rationales expressed most clearly in In re Kovich 38 and In re
Blackwell. 9 Rejecting the very narrow interpretation of Judge Mabey in Iacovoni,40 yet not prepared to adopt the "anything goes"
33. 3 Bankr. 420.
34. The Code is clear on the point that the plan must also be filed in good
faith and represent a meaningful effort by the debtor to pay all debtors in accordance with his ability to do so. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (Collier 1985) and 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) and (2) (Collier 1985).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Collier 1985).
36. In fact, he must do so. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (Collier 1985).
37. 9 Bankr. 424.
38. 4 Bankr. 403.
39. 5 Bankr. 748 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).
40. 2 Bankr. 256.
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4 1 In re Dziedzic 2 adopts a position
policy of Sutherland,
that analyzes § 1322 and § 1122 "with an eye towards what is practical for
the debtor."' 3
In re Dziedzic" involved two issues: may a creditor with an
unsecured claim ever receive different treatment from that of like
creditors; and if so, what are the appropriate circumstances, if any,
for granting such treatment? 4 Cognizant of the chaotic case law
and the failure of the major treatises to do little more than straddle the fence, the opinion grapples with these issues with candor.'6
In order to resolve the issue presented, the court analyzed past decisions of other courts. In re Iacovoni47 was correctly interpreted as
allowing only minimal classification so that § 1322 is rendered virtually meaningless except for the statutory exceptions contained in
§ 1122.48 In re Sutherland49 was incorrectly found to be too broad
holding that "any sort of standard, claiming that no such animal as
'unfair discrimination' could exist when the debtor was not obligated to pay the creditors anything more than they would receive
under a Chapter 7.'"50 Sutherland,5 in effect, read unfair discrimination out of the Code under its holding.
The Dzeidzic court cites with approval the analyses and conclusions reached by In re Kovich5 2 and In re Blackwell. 3 In re
Kovich 54 decided two cases factually similar. In both cases the
value of assets and equities were less than the general exemption
allowed the debtor under the Code, and if the estates were liquidated under Chapter 7, the debtors could distribute nothing to unsecured creditors. The repayments amounted to 10% and 5% respectively; however, the court did not comment on the propriety or
sufficiency of these amounts.5 5 The issue before the court for reso-

41. 3 Bankr. 420.
42. 9 Bankr. 424.
43. Id. at 426.

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 424-45.
Id. at 426.
2 Bankr. 256.
9 Bankr. at 426.
3 Bankr. 420.
9 Bankr. at 426.
3 Bankr. 420.
4 Bankr. 403.
5 Bankr. 748.
4 Bankr. 403.
Id. at 404-05.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss3/2
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lution was "whether the plans must fail because of separate classification accorded the obligations involving a creditor and landlord
which would result in full payment while other unsecured creditors
are paid only a portion of their debts." 6 After reviewing authority
on both sides of the question the court held that separate classifications for debts which are substantially similar are not forbidden
by the Code.5 7 The court correctly determined that § 1122(a) requires all claims classified together to be substantially similar but
also found that § 1122(a) did not require all substantially similar
claims to be grouped together in the same class.
Kovich held that although some unsecured creditors receive
more than other unsecured creditors with similar claims in legal
character or effect vis-a-vis the debtor's assets, it is not per se unfair discrimination. 8 Here the court deviates from other courts'
decisions and looks to the real world effect of its decision, stating:
The fact that these creditors receive more than other unsecured creditors, certainly is a form of discrimination. But it is
not necessarily unfair. It may be that in order for a debtor to
avail himself of a Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7 liquidation, he
will have to make special arrangements in the plan for an obligation that a friend or relative co-signed. If he proposes to pay only
a percentage of that debt, the creditor can obtain a lift of stay
and proceed against the co-debtor under Section 1301(c). Likewise, because of a debtor's financial and family situation and the
availability of other housing, it may be necessary to make a special provision for past due rent. Such classifications may not be
unfair to other unsecured creditors because if they are not permitted the debtor may be forced to file under Chapter 7 and they
may receive nothing.
Therefore, the classifications are not unfair
59
discrimination.
The court also found that each case should be decided on its own
merits. The court proposed five elements or guidelines in determining what is unfair discrimination:
1. Is there a reasonable basis for the classification?
2. Is the debtor able to perform a plan without classification?
3. Has the debtor acted in good faith in the proposed
classification?
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 405.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.
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4. The treatment of the class discriminated against.
5. Are creditors receiving a meaningful payment or is the plan
60
just a sham?
The court found that separate classification of unsecured
claims with similar legal rights or interests vis-a-vis the debtor's
estate is permissible and enumerated the above criteria for purposes of determining
when classifications
are unfairly
discriminatory.
The Dziedzic court was not convinced that Kovich6 1 contained
a sufficient statement of the policy-concerns involved. The final
link in the analysis was In re Blackwell.2 Factually, this case is
very similar to those discussed in Kovich,6 3 one unsecured creditor
receiving 100% repayment while other similarly situated unsecured creditors received a nominal 5% under the plan." While
Blackwell adopts the analysis and guidelines of Kovich and adds
nothing new, it does provide a different perspective. The major
emphasis of the Blackwell court was the effect of the debtor's actions upon the affected unsecured creditors. This was the light in
which the Dziedzic court read Blackwell and is clearly reflected in
the criteria set forth in Blackwell's good faith analysis.6 5 Applying
this new good faith standard of Blackwell6 to the facts before it,
the Dziedzic court found the plan deficient because the debtor had
failed to provide adequate evidence demonstrating the need for
60. Id. See also In re Gibson, 45 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985) wherein
Judge W. Homer Drake listed the first four factors set forth above as being the
four factors which should be considered by a court in assessing the question of
whether or not a classification is unfairly discriminatory. Judge Drake's analysis
appears to be sound and will be helpful to the reader in analyzing other discrimination cases.
61. 4 Bankr. 403.
62. 5 Bankr. 748.
63. 4 Bankr. 403.
64. 5 Bankr. at 750.
65. Id. at 751. Notice that the court adopts a stringent standard for good
faith which goes beyond simple honesty. The court stated at page 751:
In determining whether a plan is proposed in good faith several factors
must be considered; the debtor's ability to pay, prior petitions in bankruptcy courts, extent and nature of the debts, division by classes and the
extent of preferential treatment between classes, the inability to obtain a
discharge or the extent of questionable dischargeability of large claims in
Chapter 7, the relationship of attorney fees and administrative costs to
the distribution to unsecured creditors, and particularly, whether the
proposed distribution to unsecured creditors is meaningful.
66. Id.
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12

McLaughlin and Nelms:
Classification of Unsecured Claims in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptc
CLASSIFICATION OF UNSECURED CLAIMS
19851

this classification. The court felt the debtor had offered only
"flimsy evidence of consequences." 7 However, the court was not
very imformative as to what degree or how much evidence would
be sufficient to convince the court in this respect. The second defect was the disparity between the 100% repayment and the 30%
repayment to different classes with essentially identical legal entitlements.6 8 The Dziedzic court found that the "Kovich guidelines
coupled with Blackwell's concern for the impact on the other creditors strikes a good balance between the clashing concepts." 9
The Dziedzic approach does not ignore the realities of Chapter
13 cases. It seems to expose the flaw of the In re Sutherland70 approach in that the Dziedzic court did not ignore the fact that a
Chapter 13 plan must be offered in good faith. 71 It would not appear to be good faith where a debtor is offering to pay 100% to
certain unsecured creditors because of compelling reasons on behalf of the debtor to do so, and at the same time pay five or ten
percent to remaining creditors. Before this issue can be decided,
however, the court must look at the ability of the debtor to make
higher payments across the board. Obviously, if the debtor has the
ability to make more than five or ten percent payments to the remaining unsecured creditors the plan should not be confirmed,
even under the pre-1984 amendments to the Code. 2 On the other
hand, In re Dziedzic7 3 is preferable to the reasoning of In re
Iacovoni74 in that it does allow for reasonable classification of
claims which should encourage debtors to file more Chapter 13
plans, which is consistent with the intent of Congress in adopting
Chapter 13 under the 1978 act.
D.

The Three Approaches Compared
The above three interpretations of § 1322 and § 1122 re67. 9 Bankr. at 427.

68. Id. The court was extremely summary in this analysis, again offering no
insight into what would be an acceptable amount of disparity.
69. Id.
70. 3 Bankr. 420.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (Collier 1985).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) and (2) (Collier 1985). Please note that these requirements do not apply unless the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured
claim objects to the plan's confirmation. Under the pre-1984 Code, it would appear that § 1325(a)(3)'s good faith requirement would require this anyway.
73. 9 Bankr. 424.
74. 2 Bankr. 256.
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present the mainstream approaches to the problem of classification
of unsecured claims in Chapter 13. While each attempts to grapple
with the shortcomings and ambiguities of the Code, each has its
own particular strengths and weaknesses.
In re Sutherland75 appears to run afoul of the legislative intent of Chapter 13. As Senator DeConcini said in the final Senate
debates surrounding these two Code sections:
Debtors under this Chapter will be able to voluntarily pay off
their debts while being under the protection of the court. This
allows for greater pay outs to creditors than would probably occur
if the debtor took straight bankruptcy, and it preserves the
debtor's self-esteem by permitting him to pay his debts using his
76
best efforts without incurring undue hardships.
Congress did not intend Chapter 13 to effect an end run around
the disadvantages of liquidation while at the same time sanctioning nominal repayment to creditors. Sutherland7 does not really
confront the discrimination issue squarely. The Sutherland approach assumes that because the creditor stands to benefit more
under the Chapter 13 plan than under a hypothetical Chapter 7
liquidation, no unfair discrimination exists.7 8 This analysis begs
the question posed by § 1322(b)(1). It is clear from a reading of §
1322 that classification of claims is sanctioned.7 9 It is unfair discrimination' that is prohibited and Sutherland0 fails to address
this issue. This essentially has the effect of rendering § 1322 as "an
unnecessary restatement of § 1325(a)(4)." '8 1 The Sutherland8 2 decision is consistent with the overall liberal construction to be accorded the Chapter 13 provisions but fails to consider the underlying purposes of Chapter 13 and the chapter's provisions as an
integrated unit. Rather, it focuses narrowly on one subsection.
The interpretation advanced by In re Iacovoni83 no doubt
owes much of its widespread acceptance to the stature of its proponent, Judge Ralph Mabey. However, this restrictive view of debt
classification has met with increasing hostility in light of the liberal
75. 3 Bankr. 420.
76. 124 Cong. Rec. S17403-4 (Oct. 6, 1978).
77. 3 Bankr. 420.
78. Id. at 422.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (Collier 1985).
80. 3 Bankr. 420.
81. In re Perskin, 9 Bankr. 626, 632 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
82. 3 Bankr. 420.
83. 2 Bankr. 256.
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intent of Congress in enacting Chapter 13. One of the purposes of
the 1978 changes in Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy law was to in85
8'
crease the flexibility permitted to Chapter 13 debtors. Iacovoni
has just the opposite effect. In fact, the only criteria for debt classification that could be confirmed would be either claims with dissimilar legal entitlement to debtor's assets vis-a-vis the other creditors or de minimis claims or interests dispatched for
administrative convenience." The interpretation is an emasculation of § 1322.7 Judge Mabey relies extensively on Collier'ss8 interpretation of the "substantially similar" language contained in §
1122.89 However, contained in the same passage of Collier's is language to the effect that ". . . there is no requirement that all
claims which are 'substantially similar' be placed in the same
class." 90 Judge Mabey does not address this section and goes on to
state that the "only apparent exception to a uniform classification
of unsecured creditors,. . is found in § 1122(b) which codifies the
'administrative convenience exception' .
"..."91 Judge Mabey has
in fact retreated from this position somewhat in In re Adams,92
where the court held that an alimony-child support payment was
properly classified separately from other unsecured creditors solely
due to its nondischargeability. While this is a correct reading of
the Code as to dischargeability this does not alter the legal character or effect as a claim against the debtor's assets. This claim had
identical legal rights in the debtor's assets as to all other unsecured
84. In re Cook, 26 Bankr. 187, 190 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
85. 2 Bankr. 256.
86. Id. at 260.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (Collier 1985); In re Perskin, 9 Bankr. 626, 631 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1981); In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979); In re Kovich,
4 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).
88. 5 Collier 1122.03.
89. In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256, 260.
90. 5 Collier 1 1122.03.
91. In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. at 260.
92. 12 Bankr. 540. The recent case of In re Caswell, (No. 84-1502 (4th Cir.
.1985)) provides a possible basis for holding that child support claims do not in
fact have additional rights vis-a-vis the debtor's estate. The Fourth Circuit refused to allow the debtor to even include such a claim in the debtor's Chapter 13
plan. The court preferred to have the state courts retain control over such claims.
This approach makes sense, and if followed by other courts would appear to eliminate the possibility of paying claims for child support through a Chapter 13 plan.
It is unclear whether consent by the claim holder(s) in such cases would be allowable. Can a minor consent? Can the custodial parent consent to such an arrangement? The authors feel that such consent would be ineffective.
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creditors, which directly conflicts with the Iacovoni interpretation.
Collier's further comments:
Unfair discrimination against a class of claims would therefore seem to have reference either to the order of distribution or
the percentage to be paid the particular class. If courts were to
construe as unfair discrimination a proposal to pay a particular
class of claims a greater percentage than some other class, section
1322(b)(1) would be deprived of most of its meaning. 3
This language is directly at odds with Judge Mabey's rationale underlying Iacovoni.9 4 In fact, the rationale underlying Iacovoni9 5 appears to contravene the entire liberal construction Congress intended for Chapter 13 and such inconsistency will continue to
hamper or even retard the growth of acceptance for this position.
Between the extremes of Sutherland9 and Iacovoni97 lies In
re Dziedzic.8 Dziedzic, as discussed above, is a compilation of two
cases: In re Kovich9 9 and In re Blackwell, 100 where amalgamation
has yielded a workable and practical alternative best described as:
• . . somewhere between total whim and an Act of God lies the
answer to what justification is needed to hew out a particular
class of unsecured creditors. Such classification should be based
upon guidelines flexible and practical enough to be adapted to the
circumstances of every case yet definitive enough to provide assistance to debtors and their attorneys when formulating a plan.10 1
The benefit of this type of analysis is obvious to debtor and
creditor alike especially in light of the "fresh start" purpose of
bankruptcy law. This method would allow the debtor to pay unsecured creditors essential to reorganization such as landlords and
banks. It also benefits creditors by saving the liquidation under
Chapter 7 where unsecured creditors routinely receive zero payment. Unlike Sutherland' 2 and Iacovoni,03 which in their own
93. 5 Collier 1 1322.01.
94. 2 Bankr. 256.
95. Id.
96. 3 Bankr. 420.
97. 2 Bankr. 256.
98. 9 Bankr. 424.
99. 4 Bankr. 403.
100. 5 Bankr. 748.
101. In re Hill, 4 Bankr. at 698.
102. 3 Bankr. 420.
103. 2 Bankr. 256,
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way attempt to read sections of the Code out of existence or ignore
them completely, Dziedzic'0 4 would appear to read sections into
the Code. The elemental guidelines proposed by Kovich'0 5 and
adopted in Dziedzic '06 have no statutory authorization or basis in
the Code.
Dziedzic speaks of a "rational basis" for the classification and
support for this requirement is extensive.10 7 No authority is cited
for this position. Neither the Code itself nor the legislative history
contains such terminology. The Dziedzic guidelines are without
statutory precedent and amount to little more than judicial
legislation.
All three of these interpretations attempt to solve a very difficult problem posed by the classification of unsecured claims. All
three opinions are inconsistent with the language of the Code. This
difficulty of reaching uniform results under the Code cannot be
said to be the fault of the jurists who mediate these controversies
nor the practitioners who litigate them. This situation points its
finger directly at the one clear source of this confusion and very
likely its only hope of resolution-the Code and its
drafter-Congress.
IV.

PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

Lawyers, scholars, commentators, and others could argue at
length as to whether the approach taken in the case of In re Sutherland,10 8 or that taken in the case of In re Iacovoni,1 0 9 or that
taken in the case of In re Dziedzic'10 is a correct interpretation of
§ 1322(b)(1). 1 " However, which of these is the correct interpretation of § 1322(b)(1) is' not extremely important. A simple reading
of the statute indicates that Judge Mabey's analysis in Iacovoni
most closely parallels the statutory language. For that reason
alone, it is arguably the correct analysis. However, the reasoning of
the Dziedzic court is closer to what Congress envisioned in light of
104. 9 Bankr. 424.
105. 4 Bankr. 403.
106. 9 Bankr. at 427.
107. Id. at 427. See also In re Fizer, 1 Bankr. 400 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979); In
re Blevins, 1 Bankr. 442 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979); In re Tatum, 1 Bankr. 445
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979); In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
108. 3 Bankr. 420.
109. 2 Bankr. 256.
110. 9 Bankr. 424.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (Collier 1985).
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the overall purposes and goals of Chapter 13. Even Sutherland's
wide open approach possibly has some support. 1 '2
The real question which should be asked is: "why do we allow
classification in Chapter 13 cases in the first place." It is well established that Chapter 13 is the preferred proceeding for consumer
debtors as far as Congress is concerned." ' The authors view the
purpose of classification as making Chapter 13 flexible and more
attractive to debtors. In other words, this provision, like the
"super-discharge" provided by § 1328(a), 1 4 is a carrot designed to
encourage debtors to file Chapter 13 proceedings instead of Chapter 7.115 Everything under the present Code indicates that Chapter
13 is the preferred proceeding. This leads one back to the present
problem of what type of. classification is appropriate under §
1322(b)(1). An examination of the cases reveals the ambiguities inherent in the statutory language. Since Chapter 13 is the preferred
bankruptcy proceeding for consumer debtors, it seems appropriate
to amend § 1322(b)(1) to more closely reflect this preference. It is
believed the following suggested statutory language would not only
be more consistent with the underlying goals and purposes of
Chapter 13, but that it would also remove some of the ambiguity
which is currently being caused by the present statutory language:
Subject to § 1325 and subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the
plan may place unsecured claims in separate classes if separate
classification aids the debtor in proposing and carrying out the
plan. No classification shall be considered to be unfair as long as
there is a reasonable basis for the classification, and the classification is advantageous to the debtor's successful completion of the
plan. Subject to Section 1325 and subsections (a) and (c) of this
section, a plan may always treat claims for a consumer debt of the
debtor differently than other unsecured claims if an individual is
liable on such consumer debt with the debtor.
112. The position seems less viable in light of the 1984 amendments found in
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (Collier 1985).
113. McLaughlin, Lien Avoidance by Debtors in Chapter 13, 58 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 45 n.139 (1984) and accompanying discussion.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Collier 1985).
115. After the 1984 amendments to the Code it is even clearer that Congress
prefers debtors to file Chapter 13 if at all possible. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(b) which
allows the court to dismiss consumer bankruptcy cases commenced under Chapter
7 under certain circumstances. For a case applying the new provisions in dismissing a case, see In re Bryant, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 987 (Bankr. W.D.
N.C. 1984).
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The authors do not believe that the above proposal will solve
all the problems involved in classification of claims in Chapter 13.
Nevertheless, this proposal, or one similar to it, should certainly
remove some of the ambiguities which presently plague the courts
and the practitioners in this area.
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